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I. Introduction
The National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") and its
licensing affiliate, The Collegiate Licensing Company ("CLC"),
license the names and likenesses of college athletes and reap large
profits from them. Under the NCAA's bylaws, college athletes must
remain "amateurs," and as such, are barred from controlling use of
their likenesses in the media and from profiting from their
participation in collegiate sports. The ban on profiting from
participation in college sports applies in perpetuity. The NCAA and
CLC are now defendants in a number of putative class-action lawsuits
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brought by former college athletes alleging antitrust and Lanham Act
violations in connection with the NCAA's licensing of their names
and likenesses for video games, championship game DVDs and other
merchandise.
Some of these cases have been consolidated in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California, including the two this
Note will focus on: O'Bannon v. NCAA and Keller v. Electronic Arts.
Ed O'Bannon was a star player for UCLA's basketball team, and his
case focuses on NCAA/CLC's sale and distribution of
commemorative DVDs containing footage of UCLA's 1995
championship win. Sam Keller, a former quarterback for the
University of Nebraska, challenges NCAA/CLC's authorization of
players' likenesses used in NCAA-licensed football and basketball
games manufactured by Electronic Arts ("EA").
The NCAA has unfairly profited at the expense of college
athletes, and the court should fashion relief for the class of plaintiffs
to address the unjust enrichment. The NCAA should remedy the
situation by creating a system of trusts into which profit-sharing
payments could be deposited for college athletes while they are still
subject to the rules of amateurism.
II. Background
A. The Defendants
The NCAA is an unincorporated association that describes itself
as "the organization through which the colleges and universities of
the nation speak and act on athletics matters at the national level."'
It is a "voluntary association of more than 1,000 institutions,
conferences and organizations."2 The NCAA was founded in 1906 (as
the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States) to
regulate collegiate football and to address growing safety concerns on
behalf of student athletes.' The name of the association was changed
in 1910 to reflect its national character.' Today, the NCAA
encompasses approximately 1,315 member institutions and governs a
1. Class Action Complaint at 3, O'Bannon v. N.C.A.A., No. CV-09 3329 (N.D. Cal.
July 29, 2009) [hereinafter "O'Bannon Complaint"].
2. Id.
3. Laura Freedman, Note, Pay or Play? The Jeremy Bloom Decision and NCAA
Amateurism Rules, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 673, 674-75 (2003).
4. Id.
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full range of collegiate sports for men and women.' Its purposes have
greatly expanded from merely regulating the safety of college
football.' The NCAA's current objectives are to "[p]romote student-
athletes and college sports through public awareness; protect student-
athletes through standards of fairness and integrity; prepare student-
athletes for lifetime leadership; [and p]rovide student-athletes and
college sports with the funding to help meet these goals."'
CLC is a for-profit corporation and a division of IMG Worldwide,
Inc. ("IMG"), a global entertainment and marketing corporation.
CLC is the "official licensing representative" for the NCAA, and
"manag[es] the licensing rights for nearly 200 leading institutions that
represent more than $3 billion in retail sales and more than 75%
share of the college licensing market."' CLC's website states that the
market for collegiate licensed merchandise is an estimated $4 billion
per year.o
EA is a publicly-traded corporation that "develops, publishes, and
distributes interactive software worldwide for video game systems,
personal computers, cellular handsets and the Internet."" In the 2008
fiscal year, EA reported $3.67 billion in revenues. The NCAA has
entered into license agreements with EA that authorize the use of
likenesses of student-athletes in video games produced by EA.13 EA
produces the NCAA Football, NCAA Basketball, and NCAA March
Madness franchises, which include video games that simulate matches
between NCAA member schools. 4
B. The Plaintiffs
Ed O'Bannon played basketball as a student at the University of
California, Los Angeles ("UCLA") from 1991 to 1995." In the 1994-
95 season, O'Bannon led his team to a national championship and
5. Composition & Sport Sponsorship of the NCAA, NCAA, http://ncaa.org/
wps/portal/ncaahome?WCMGLOBALCONTEXT=/ncaa/NCAA/About%20T
he%20NCAA/Membership/membershipbreakdown.html (last visited Jan. 16,2011).
6. Freedman, supra note 3, at 675.
7. Id. at 675-76.
8. See O'Bannon Complaint, supra note 1, at 3.
9. Id. at 14.
10. Id. at 3.
11. Id. at 14.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Class Action Complaint at 3, Keller v. Elec. Arts, No. CV-09 1967 (N.D. Cal. May
5, 2009) [hereinafter "Keller Complaint"].
15. See O'Bannon Complaint, supra note 1, at 10.
received the John R. Wooden award as the nation's best men's
basketball player for that season, as well as the postseason
tournament Most Outstanding Player Award from the Associated
Press." He complied with the NCAA's regulations while a student-
athlete at UCLA, and now alleges that his image is being offered for
sale and/or use by the NCAA without his consent and without
compensation." O'Bannon specifically cites the NCAA's sale of
championship game DVDs through its website, which features an
advertising copy containing O'Bannon's name and image, identifying
him as the Most Outstanding Player of the 1995 postseason
tournament. 8
Sam Keller played football for Arizona State University ("ASU")
and the University of Nebraska ("Nebraska") from 2003 to 2007."'
Keller alleges that the NCAA conspired with EA to license use of his
name and likeness in various videogames without his consent and
without compensating him, and points to the similarities between his
physical appearance and jersey numbers in reality and within the EA
games. 20 To highlight the injustice of the NCAA's collegiate licensing
deal with EA, Keller notes in his complaint that EA paid the NFL
Players' Union, through its licensing arm, nearly $35 million per year
for similar usage of professional players' names and likenesses in its
* 21video games.
There are two plaintiff classes that O'Bannon and Keller seek to
represent: The Damages Class and the Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief Class. The "Damages Class" consists of former college
athletes who are no longer subject to the NCAA's amateurism
regulations, and the "Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Class"
includes both former and current student-athletes.22
C. The NCAA's Amateurism Rules
The NCAA's Constitution and Bylaws constitute a contract
between the NCAA and member universities, 23 and the student-
athletes who play for these universities are third-party beneficiaries of
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 10-11.
19. Id. at 11.
20. Keller Complaint, supra note 14, at 11-13.
21. Id. at 10.
22. See O'Bannon Complaint, supra note 1, at 15-16.
23. Freedman, supra note 3, at 688.
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this contract.2 4 Bylaw 12 establishes that only amateur athletes are
allowed to participate in athletics sanctioned by the NCAA, and it
outlines a number of different ways in which athletes may lose their
amateur status by accepting compensation.25 Generally, under Bylaw
12, student-athletes may not commercially exploit their own names
and likenesses for profit as that is a direct violation of the amateurism
regulations.26
While the student-athletes are themselves prohibited from
profiting in such a way, Article 12.5.1.1 of the Bylaws (the
"Institutional, Charitable, or Nonprofit Promotions" section) appears
to allow schools and conferences to commercially exploit the names
and likenesses of the student-athletes, as long as all monies derived go
to the member institution.27 The language of Article 12.5.1.1 states:
12.5.1.1.1 Promotions Involving NCAA Championships,
Events, Activities or Programs. The NCAA [or a third party
acting on behalf of the NCAA (e.g., host institution,
conference, local organizing committee)] may use the name or
picture of an enrolled student-athlete to generally promote
NCAA championships or other NCAA events, activities or
programs. (Adopted: 8/7/03)
O'Bannon and Keller allege that the NCAA uses this ambiguous
language to justify its licensing of student-athletes' (and former
student-athletes') names and likenesses for profit while not sharing
this profit with the athletes, as that would then violate the general
prohibition under Bylaw 12.29 While the language of Bylaw 12 allows
use of names and likenesses of persons (including athletes) affiliated
with a university for limited promotional reasons, O'Bannon and
Keller allege that the NCAA has distorted this language to enter into
profitable and illegal licensing agreements."
In order to maintain eligibility, student-athletes are also required
by the NCAA to sign "Form 08-3a" each year.31 Form 08-3a purports
24. Id. at 689.
25. NCAA Division I Manual art. 12, NCAA, 61-76 (2009-2010), http://www.ncaa
publications.com/Uploads[PDF/D1_Manual9d74aOb2-dl0d-4587-8902-bOc78lel28ae.pdf
(setting forth the bylaws concerning amateurism).
26. Id. at 74.
27. Freedman, supra note 3, at 689.
28. NCAA Division I Manual, supra note 25.
29. See O'Bannon Complaint, supra note 1, at 5.
30. See generally O'Bannon Complaint, supra note 1; Keller Complaint, supra note 14.
31. Freedman, supra note 3, at 689.
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to require the student-athletes to relinquish all rights in perpetuity to
commercial use of their images, both while they are playing for
member universities and after graduation,3 2 when they are
presumably no longer subject to the NCAA's amateurism regulations.
O'Bannon and Keller allege that Form 08-3a does not act as a
relinquishment in perpetuity, but only acts as a release form for the
period of eligibility that it covers.3 ' Thus, the plaintiffs allege that the
NCAA and its member institutions have conspired to act as if these
forms constitute perpetual licenses, and have based licensing
agreements (such as those with CLC and EA) on these "perpetual
licenses," creating a group boycott or refusal to deal.34
D. The Right of Publicity
Federal courts have found a common law property right in an
individual's right to publicity, which amounts to the inverse of the
right to privacy." The right to one's identity has commercial value
apart from concerns about privacy. While much of the litigation
concerning the right of publicity arises under the Lanham Act and the
"likelihood of confusion" analysis, the right to publicity has also been
recognized as a separate and distinct property right that may be
defended regardless of whether or not confusion about the source is
likely to result.37
Some believe that if profit is to be made from use or licensing of a
name, likeness, or other distinguishing personal characteristic, the
owner of the characteristic ought to have the right to those profits."
The perverse result of the NCAA's amateurism guidelines,
specifically the loophole under "Institutional, Charitable, or
Nonprofit Promotions" (Article 12.5.1.1), is that it takes that right
away from the student-athletes and gives it entirely to the
universities."
The NCAA has acknowledged that student-athletes possess a
right of publicity and that neither the NCAA nor its member
32. Id.
33. Id. at 5-6.
34. Id.
35. See Haelan v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953); see also
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575 (1977)(recognizing a right of
publicity cause of action and liability when defendant profited from violating it).
36. Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See Freedman, supra note 3, at 693.
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institutions own this right.40 In September 2008, NCAA President
Myles Brand stated that the NCAA would not sue its business
partner, the CBS television network, over the use of college player
information in a fantasy sports game:
The stake in the ground is the right to control publicity by
athletes of their names, likenesses and identification. Indeed,
courts might very well find that student-athletes should be
held apart from professional athletes in this application. The
benefit that naturally comes with the publicity of names and
statistics for professionals is critical enough that those athletes
assign their rights to organizations to manage. But in the case
of intercollegiate athletics, the right of publicity is held by the
student-athletes, not the NCAA. We would find it difficult to
bring suit over the abuse of a right we don't own.41
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition defines a
violation of the right of publicity as a wrongful appropriation of "the
commercial value of a person's identity by using without consent the
person's name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of
trade. . . ."42 The "other indicia of identity" language is important in
cases such as O'Bannon's and Keller's because the plaintiffs will not
need to show that their names or likenesses were used without their
permission.43 Rather, they will only need to meet the lower bar of
showing that indicia of their identities has been misappropriated by
the NCAA." NCAA member schools, and the NCAA itself, have
long engaged in the kind of hair-splitting that this inclusive rule is
designed to discourage.45
For example, there is a common practice among NCAA member
schools of selling numbered replica jerseys of their star players in
campus bookstores and online. 6 These are not only retired jersey
numbers, but also the active numbers currently being used by players
40. See O'Bannon Complaint, supra note 1, at 7.
41. Id.
42. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995).
43. Anastasios Kaburakis, et al., NCAA Student-Athletes' Rights of Publicity, EA
Sports and the Video Game Industry: The Keller Forecast, 27 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 1, 21
(2009).
44. Id.
45. Sean Hanlon and Ray Yasser, 'J.J. Morrison' And His Right of Publicity Lawsuit
Against the NCAA, 15 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 241, 267 (2008).
46. Id.
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on NCAA teams.47 The NCAA prohibits the selling of jerseys with
the players' names on them, as that would violate the prohibition
against using players' names or likenesses to promote commercial
ventures.4 8 However, it turns a blind eye to those featuring only
numbers, even though it has been recognized that the numbers
correspond to those stars' unique identities49 and are a "meaningful
substitute for their names."'o
Similarly, in many of the EA video games, players are identified
only by their jersey numbers, which should be enough "indicia of
identity" to support a right of publicity claim, especially given the
additional factors that identify these characters as specific real-life
athletes. Keller's complaint cites the very obvious attempt by EA to
recreate the physical likenesses of athletes in its games, which it
achieves with near photographic realism:
Electronic Arts seeks to replicate each school's entire team.
With rare exception, virtually every real-life Division I
football or basketball player has a corresponding player in
Electronic Arts' games with the same jersey number, and
virtually identical height, weight, build and home state. In
addition, Electronic Arts matches the player's skin tone, hair
color, and often even a player's hair style . . . "
In other words, just as in its acceptance of the practice of selling
numbered jerseys, the NCAA has allowed EA to appropriate every
element of identification of these athletes apart from their actual
names. In the Ninth Circuit, where O'Bannon and Keller's cases
have been filed, other right of publicity cases have been decided in
favor of plaintiffs based only on this type of indicia, sometimes based
on even less obvious appropriation.5
47. Marcia Chambers, Sales of College Stars' Jerseys Raise Ethical Concerns, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 31, 2004, at D1.
48. Id.
49. See O'Bannon Complaint, supra note 1, at 57.
50. Chambers, supra note 47.
51. See Keller Complaint, supra note 14, at 4.
52. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am. Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1515 (9th Cir. 1993)
(expanding the right of publicity to include representation that only "suggested" the
plaintiff through characteristic dress and behavior, even though name and likeness was not
used); and Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds, 498 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding
that the impossibility of recognizing a racecar driver's face did not preclude a finding that
his identity had been misappropriated because distinctive markings on his car made him
readily identifiable).
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III. Analysis
A. Litigation History
The NCAA has been a defendant in a number of lawsuits brought
by current and former student-athletes, some of which have involved
challenges to the amateurism guidelines.53 A notable recent case
involved Jeremy Bloom, a University of Colorado ("Colorado")
quarterback who sought to maintain endorsement deals connected
with his non-NCAA-governed Olympic and professional skiing
career.54 Bloom's skiing career predated his enrollment at Colorado
and was not subject to the amateurism conditions of his relationship
with the school vis-A-vis football." Bloom declined the scholarship
Colorado offered him for playing football, and wanted only to
continue skiing in the off-season and to collect his endorsements to
pay for continued ski training.56 The NCAA denied his request for a
waiver, even though waivers are routinely granted to other student-
athletes who play professional sports in their off-seasons.:" This is
because waivers are available only for student-athletes who draw
traditional salaries in the off-season. 8  Because skiers are paid
through endorsements, the NCAA deemed Bloom's payments
violated the precise language of its bylaws, and Bloom was disallowed
from collecting his endorsements." This case highlights the strict way
in which the amateurism guidelines are generally interpreted.
Although the Bloom ruling was appealed to the district court, the
NCAA generally settles cases in which it is a defendant by paying
large amounts of money to plaintiffs 0 In doing so, the NCAA has
53. See, e.g. Gaines v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 746 F. Supp. 738, 744 (M.D.
Tenn. 1990)(upholding the "no agent" and "no draft" provisions of Bylaw 12 and
declaring college athlete ineligible for college play after participating in NFL draft); Banks
v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 977 F. 2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992)(holding that "no draft"
and "no agent" rules do not constitute illegal restraint on trade).
54. Bloom v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 93 P. 3d 621, 622 (Colo. App. 2004).
55. Id.
56. Freedman, supra note 3, at 678-79
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 679-80.
60. See White v. NCAA, No. CV 06-0999 VBF (C.D. Cal., filed 2007) (settlement
pending among NCAA and class of Division I men's football and basketball players who
alleged that capping an institution's scholarship-granting capabilities to Grant In Aid
("GIA") was a violation of the Sherman Act), see also Mark Alesia, 3 Lawsuits May
Change How NCAA Operates, USA TODAY, July 26, 2009, http://www.usatoday.
com/sports/college/2009-07-26-ncaa-lawsuitsN.htm (describing a number of settlements,
been able to keep the terms of its contracts with licensees private.6 1
Thus far, the NCAA has been unable to settle the claims brought by
Keller and O'Bannon, fueling speculation that it may no longer be
able to maintain this level of privacy.6 In February 2010, the district
court denied the NCAA's motion to dismiss the suit, which could
have the important result of making its licensing deals subject to
public scrutiny through discovery.3 The suit has also attracted the
attention of lawmakers who are interested in the tax-exempt status of
the NCAA and its continuing viability.6
A recent case brought by retired National Football League
("NFL") players may also be influential here.5 In 2007, Herb
Adderley, a retired Hall of Fame cornerback, filed suit on behalf of a
class of 2,056 retired players who claimed that the National Football
League Players' Association ("NFLPA") cut them out of lucrative
licensing deals with EA for its "Madden NFL" video games.6
Specifically, the retired players objected to EA's obscuring their
identities in its "Classic Series" games to avoid paying for use of their
likenesses. A federal jury, also in the Northern District of
California, was moved by e-mails indicating that the NFL had
conspired with EA, and awarded $28.1 million to the plaintiffs (three
quarters of which represented punitive damages).68 Even though the
award was later reduced to $26.25 million, it still represented a
significant victory for the retired players.6 ' This case also sheds light
on what may happen in O'Bannon and Keller's case, as it has now
passed the summary judgment stage and could be placed in front of
including a 1999 settlement where the NCAA paid a $54 million to "restricted earnings"
assistant basketball coaches, whose compensation was limited by association rules).
61. Pete Thamel, NCAA Fails to Stop Licensing Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2010, at
B14.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Kurt Streeter, Former UCLA Star Ed O'Bannon Leads Suit against NCAA Over
Use of Images, L.A. TIMES, July 22, 2009, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/
jul/22/sports/sp-videogames-lawsuit 22.
66. Union, Retired Players Agree to $26.25 Million Settlement of Lawsuit,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, 2009, http://www.nfl.com/news/story?id=09000d5d8lOaa9df
&template=without-video-with-comments&confirm=true.
67. NFL Players Union Reaches $26.25M Settlement with Retirees over Madden ... Is
EA Lawsuit Next?, GAME POLITICS (June 5, 2009), http://www.gamepolitics.com/ 2009/
06/05/nfl-players-union-reaches-2625m-settlement-retirees-over-madden-ea-lawsuit-next.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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another sympathetic jury."o It now seems likely that a jury could be
persuaded that the individual players, especially former players,
should be given some share of the egregiously large profits posted by
EA and CLC.
Finally, the Supreme Court's decision in NCAA v. Board of
Regents of the University of Oklahoma has important implications for
any solution that may arise in response to the O'Bannon and Keller
suit." This decision resolved a dispute over the NCAA's license
agreements with two broadcast networks and set forth the parameters
for televising NCAA football games.72 In addition, the Court's
language and reasoning further suggests its strong preference for
upholding the NCAA's amateurism requirements at all costs." The
Court noted the unique nature of the NCAA and its "product"
(college football games) in this way:
The identification of this "product" with an academic
tradition differentiates college football from and makes it
more popular than professional sports to which it might
otherwise be comparable, such as, for example, minor league
baseball. In order to preserve the character and quality of the
"product," athletes must not be paid, must be required to
attend class, and the like. And the integrity of the "product"
cannot be preserved except by mutual agreement; if an
institution adopted such restrictions unilaterally, its
effectiveness as a competitor on the playing field might soon
be destroyed.74
Thus, the Supreme Court in Board of Regents points out that
amateurism is the very thing that makes college sports unique and
popular." In light of this position, it seems unlikely that any proposed
solution that would tamper with the longstanding tradition of
amateurism will be well-received. Further, such solutions may even
prove harmful to the balance that makes NCAA-sanctioned sports
profitable in the first place.
70. Thamel, supra note 61.
71. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
72. Id.
73. Vladimir P. Belo, The Shirts Off Their Backs: Colleges Getting Away with
Violating the Right of Publicity, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 133, 152 (1996).
74. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101-02.
75. Belo, supra note 73, at 152.
76. See supra Part III.B.
B. Proposed Solutions Based on College Athletes as 'Employees'
Many of the proposed solutions to resolve the dispute between
the NCAA and both current and former student-athletes revolve
around the designation of college athletes as "employees" and the
creation of a union or unions with collective bargaining power."
While there is some indication that it may be possible to designate
college athletes as "employees" of the universities (though maybe not
of the NCAA itself), there are a number of practical and
philosophical reasons that these solutions are not viable.
The first major obstacle to this type of solution arises from the
difficulty of characterizing student-athletes as "employees." The
most closely analogous group is graduate student assistants, who have
attempted to obtain such a designation and have met with only
limited and intermittent success." In New York University, the
National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") determined that
graduate student assistants were employees, and could form a union
to bargain collectively under the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA").o The NLRB reversed this decision four years later in
Brown University, however, returning to its earlier jurisprudence on
the subject of graduate assistants and denying them the right to
organize under the NLRA."' This reflects the current trend in
denying unionization to graduate student assistants, as they are
thought to be students first, employees second, and only in a limited
sense which is fully dependent on their student status.82  This
approach falls directly in line with the NCAA's posture towards
student-athletes and with the Supreme Court's position in Board of
Regents: that these athletes are students first and that their athletic
pursuits depend entirely on their academic careers.
Even if the NLRB agreed to designate college athletes as
employees of the universities for which they play, there would still be
significant difficulties in trying to create a workable union. First, the
universities would face a line-drawing question because they would
77. See Rohith A. Parasuraman, Note, Unionizing NCAA Division I Athletics: A
Viable Solution?, 57 DUKE L.J. 727, 729 (2007).
78. Id. at 735-36.
79. Id. at 736-39.
80. New York Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205 (2000).
81. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004).
82. Parasuraman, supra note 77, at 738-39.
83. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984); see also Belo,
supra note 73, at 152.
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need to decide which student-athletes qualified as employees.8
Presumably, the marquee sports of Division I men's football and
basketball would be considered first, as they generate the largest
revenues.8 5  There are other sports, however, such as women's
basketball, that also generate revenues. 6 Determining which athletes
are allowed to unionize and how they should do so presents a
significant practical challenge for the universities. Moreover, the fact
that the universities must make this determination is also likely to
cause resentment among athletes in different sports and among
different schools. Eventually, the unionization of college sports could
also profoundly affect athletic recruitment. If particular schools
became known for their favorable collective bargaining agreements,
they would likely draw top recruits away from other schools.
Similarly, if football at a particular school was unionized but baseball
was not, a future Deion Sanders might choose to focus on only one
sport .
Unionizing college sports would also have the broader impact of
recalibrating the economics of the entire system.8 Undoubtedly, any
attempt at unionization would present significant costs to the
universities, and would necessitate the creation of new administrative
and oversight organizations. As each college athlete is only on
campus for a maximum of a few years, professional staff would be
required to ensure continuity at the bargaining table.
The creation of unions would also probably disrupt the system
currently in place at many universities, where more lucrative
programs fund those that are not profitable. Despite the large
revenues generated by Division I men's basketball and football
programs, most athletic programs operate at a loss.89 Without the
availability of football and basketball profits to keep other sports
afloat, most universities would face the financial impossibility of
fielding a full slate of teams." If only the revenue-generating men's
basketball and men's football teams were financially independent,
84. See Parasuraman, supra note 77, at 739.
85. Id.
86. See Robert W. Brown & R. Todd Jewell, The Marginal Revenue Product of a
Women's College Basketball Player, 45 INDUS. REL. 96, 100 (2006).
87 Deion Sanders Career Biography and Statistics, SPORTHAVEN (Jan. 21, 2011, 8:07
PM), http://www.sporthaven.com/players/deion-sanders/. While attending Florida State
University, Deion Sanders excelled at football, baseball, and track. Id.
88. Parasuraman, supra note 77, at 750.
89. Id. at 748-49.
90. Id. at 749-50.
other teams would likely be eliminated." Additionally, it is unclear
what effect this might have on Title IX,9 which requires universities
fielding athletic teams for men to allocate equal funding to field
teams that are available for participation by women." While the
smaller, but still significant, revenues of successful women's
basketball programs might be enough to keep them viable,94 there is
no women's sport that could come close to balancing the financial
juggernaut of a Division I men's football team.95
IV. Proposal
The most likely outcome of the O'Bannon and Keller lawsuits is
that the NCAA will be forced to reevaluate its refusal to share profits
from its licensing agreements with the student-athletes whose names
and likenesses it exploits. Although the contract of adhesion
presented by Form 08-3a will need to be revisited, it is possible to
create a trust system that would allow the NCAA and its member
schools to continue to profit from licensing arrangements while also
sharing some of those profits with the student-athletes.
The elegance of a trust solution versus a collective-bargaining
solution is that it is simple, cost efficient, and would preserve the
overall structure of the NCAA. Under a trust system, costs would be
minimal, as the solution could be limited to only the students who are
actually affected. For example, it is obvious which players are
included in EA's "NCAA March Madness" video games and who
played on the UCLA Bruins' 1995 championship team. Further,
universities are aware of exactly which jersey numbers are flying off
their shelves, which is why they continue to market those specific
jerseys. The players represented by these numbers are easily
identifiable, and it would be simple and inexpensive to create a
structure for sharing profits with them. By contrast, a solution
involving unionization would necessitate great expense and the
creation of a large infrastructure at both the university and the
NCAA level.
Perhaps even more importantly, unionizing college athletics
would upend the entire tradition of amateurism on which the
NCAA's mission is founded and from which it derives value, as the
91. Id.
92. Id.at 750.
93. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000).
94. Parasuraman, supra note 77, at 750.
95. Id. at 753 n.111.
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Supreme Court held in Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma." A trust solution would allow the NCAA to continue to
operate under the ideal of amateurism, and its relationship with
member schools could remain intact.92 This is a minimally invasive
solution that preserves the overall structure of the organization and
would allow the NCAA to remain true to its ideals while still sharing
its profits with the student-athletes who help to generate them.
A. The USOC Provides a Workable Model for a Trust System for Current
and Future College Athletes
The NCAA should implement a trust system similar to that used
by the United States Olympic Committee ("USOC"). The USOC
also requires athletes to be amateurs, but its trust system recognizes
the necessity of corporate sponsorships for athletes, who need
funding for their significant training and competition expenses.8 The
USOC model allows athletes to accrue funds in a trust while they are
amateurs." These trusts are administered by USOC personnel, who
oversee disbursement for sport-related expenses such as training costs
while the athlete is still subject to the requirement of amateur
status." The USOC trustee ensures that the funds are disbursed
properly and for the specific purposes allowed under the terms of the
trust.o' The remainder may be withdrawn when the athlete has
completed his amateur career.'o2
A similar system would allow the NCAA to maintain its core
structure and objectives of "academics first, athletics second" while
offering two-fold benefits for college athletes. 3 First, the trust system
would eliminate the basic unfairness that attends Bylaw 12's blanket
prohibition on student-athletes' ability to profit from their names and
likenesses by allowing them to defer any profits until after they are no
longer subject to the amateurism regulations."
Second, the availability of funds after graduation may help to
ameliorate some of the difficulties faced by those who do not go on to
earn large salaries as professional athletes after college. Many former
96. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101-02 (1984).
97. See supra Part III.A.
98. Freedman, supra note 3, at 708.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
college athletes leave their universities in substantial debt because
their scholarships did not cover the basic necessities of life.0" A
recent study conducted by an advocacy group, the National College
Players' Association ("NCPA"), showed that college athletes could
be left with as much as $30,000 in normal student expenses uncovered
over the course of a typical collegiate athletic career in a Division I
program.'" This occurs because, in addition to practicing and
traveling with their teams up to forty hours per week, these college
athletes are unable to maintain part-time work.'" In many cases, their
schools actually prohibit them from working, even during the off-
season.1
The NCPA's study found that the average "scholarship shortfall"
for athletes on Division I and II "full scholarships" was $2,763 per
year, or $13,800 over the course of five years (which is a typical
attendance estimate)."0  While it is a minority of these "full
scholarship" athletes who are bona fide stars making large
contributions to the NCAA's estimated $4 billion in annual revenues,
the fact that any of these athletes are left in debt after graduation
while the NCAA profits from licensing their names and likenesses is
simply unfair.
Additionally, many former college athletes have lingering medical
expenses and require treatment and rehabilitation for long-term
injuries that result from their college playing careers."0 The NCAA
does not comprehensively regulate insurance coverage for athletes, so
coverage levels are inconsistent among member universities. As a
result, athletes can be left with large medical bills long past their
college playing days."' Profit sharing through a trust would certainly
help to bridge the gap for many former college athletes.
V. Conclusion
The Northern District of California should find that Keller,
O'Bannon, and other college athletes possess the common law right
105. See O'Bannon Complaint, supra note 1, at 59.
106. Scholarship shortfall study reveals college athletes pay to play, NATIONAL
COLLEGE PLAYERS' ASSOCIATION (Mar. 26, 2009), http://www.ncpanow.org/releases-
advisories?id=0009 [hereinafter Scholarship Shortfall Study].
107. Parasuraman, supra note 77, at 740-41.
108. Id.
109. Scholarship Shortfall Study, supra note 97.
110. Kristina Peterson, College Athletes Stuck With The Bill After Injuries, N.Y. TIMES,
July 15, 2009, at Al.
111. Id.
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of publicity, and it should find that the NCAA has violated those
rights in licensing the players' unique likenesses for its own profit.
The NCAA has subverted the intent of its own Bylaw 12.5.1.1.1 which
is only meant to cover charitable and promotional uses of the
likenesses of university-affiliated persons. To use this provision as
justification to license student-athletes' likenesses for purely
commercial reasons is overreaching. To then exclude those very
players from sharing in the profits derived from the licensing is simply
unfair.
The NCAA seems to have stretched its ability to exploit these
student and former student-athletes' likenesses to the limit. In
addition to any damages it is required to pay, the NCAA should take
the opportunity now to create a trust system that allows it to share
profits from licensing arrangements with the student-athletes whose
likenesses are used. This is an equitable solution that will allow
student-athletes a fair share of the value of their own likenesses, will
provide them with some income to make up for scholarship shortfall,
and will still enable the NCAA to maintain its overall structure based
on amateurism.
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